The Investing Journal

Notes on long term thoughtful investing

Page 6 of 7

Part 1: Dreadful Business Combinations!

Let’s start today’s discussion with a short quiz. Which of the following two companies, in absence of any other information, would you like to own?

You might feel as if things are rigged in favour of Company B! But that is what it is. B happens to be better in every aspect as against A. They both operate in the very same industry, at the very same geography, with similar asset & consumer base. Trust me, similarities are abound between these two.. because they are one and the same company! Yes, company’s name is India Cements. Column A has its reported numbers for the fiscal year 2005 and B represents what it did in the year 2007.

Before you think of hitting me, scroll back to the title of the post. We are here to discuss about some ‘dreadful’ business combinations or business characteristics which can (and does) take underlying business for a ride from time to time and how should we think about these as long term owners.


Understanding operating leverage

So what is this thing strange stuff called ‘operating leverage’ and what it has to do with the above example?

Without falling back upon text book definition, let me give you an example about it. Imagine there is swanky new residential complex planned in outskirts of the town. You happen to be the lucky one eligible to receive a permit to build a descent sized general store just opposite to this particular project. So you have your store up and running while the project is just weeks away from final completion after which several families are expected to move here. And after 12-18 months’ time there would be enough guys living in this locality that you start cribbing about traffic jams 🙂

Now, at the very first month of opening the store, your income statement would be quite under red since whether or not customers start flowing in, store rent has to be paid out – just like some other maintenance expenses. And things would continue to be more or less the same over next couple of months. But once the store has celebrated its 2nd birthday, you would be at peace to see the $$ coming. Why so, what has changed? So while your rent, staff cost, electricity and other overheads being more or less the same, increase in footfalls has led to higher inventory off-take which means higher commission earning and your bulk buying from distributors would mean that you are even eligible for some volume discount. And since your inventory are now selling quicker, you are able to convert stock into cash faster than other retailers which means you are paying early enough versus other retailers to your distributors thereby making you eligible for sweet little cash / early payment discount.

As investor, if you were to look at the initial financial numbers of this particular store say of first three months, the losses staring back at you from the income statement would suggest that it was a big time mistake in the first place. And the financials of the last three months before the end of second year would surprise you such that you may find it difficult to tell if they belong to that very store.

There has been no turnaround in the store owner’s fortunes. It is just that his business is such that most of costs are fixed and there is particular threshold of sales over and above which it starts earning money. If footfalls are expected to sustain at its current levels, it would mean that store would continue to earn those returns in the foreseeable future and those initial losses are a history.


Operating leverage, cyclicality in business earnings & intense competition

It is one of the most dreadful combinations in the business world – you can face them individually but together they can take the bottom line for a spin. Remember the example of the ‘two’ companies above?

To explain the point, let’s take our store example further. Your store looks good since its footfalls are expected to sustain at the current levels, margin spread is more or less stable and your location is pretty close to the residential complex. Now, what if there are ten more stores opened up adjacent to your store selling the very same merchandise as your store offer? Competitive rivalry would be intense which means footfalls would turn to quite volatile – fluctuating between 250 walk-ins a day to 25 depending upon the offers you dole out. This would invariably reduce your margins are well. And remember your major cost items, apart from inventory, like rent, salaries, electricity are fixed. And this means that your bottom-line is meant to show severe volatility from bursts of lucrative profits (say due to some differentiated merchandise which takes off and which other retailers don’t currently have) to prolonged period to stress.

This is exactly why this combination is very daunting (and also why you frequently do not see ten store selling same merchandise side by side in a tight locality). But there are some businesses of which these three are more or less the regular factors. Analysing these is challenging for us who are looking to own under-priced securities.

Which are these businesses? What all factors should we consider while evaluating them? How to be sure that we are not over paying for these? These are some of the questions I would try to answer in my next post which I hope would add to our understanding of such businesses.

They aren’t necessarily always bad as ‘investments’ (unlike their underlying tough business conditions), it is just that we need to clear our lenses with which we look at these and set our expectations straight while thinking about them.


Law of Small Numbers and Investing

A random event, by definition, does not lend itself to explanation, but collection of random events do behave in highly regular fashion – Daniel Kahneman

Currently, I’m reading one of the gem of a book ‘Thinking Fast & Slow’ by noble prize winner Daniel Kahneman which is basically, as one of my friend say, an encyclopaedia in the field of psychology & behavioural finance. A lot of the contents in the CFA level 3 subject on behavioural finance has been taken up from the experiments about which Kahneman talks at length in this book. Do yourself a favour and read (and absorb) what he has to say on the subject.

(F)law of small numbers

In one of the chapters he goes at length to discuss what he calls ‘law of small numbers’

He cites a study of kidney cancer carried on in United States –

A study of the incidence of kidney cancer in the 3,141 counties of the United States reveals a remarkable pattern. The counties in which the incidence of kidney cancer is lowest are mostly rural, sparsely populated, and located in traditionally Republican states in the Midwest, the South, and the West. What do you make of this?

Your mind has been very active in the last few seconds.. You deliberately searched memory and formulated hypotheses. Some effort was involved.. You probably rejected the idea that Republican politics provide protection against kidney cancer. Very likely, you ended up focusing on the fact that the counties with low incidence of cancer are mostly rural. The witty statisticians Howard Wainer and Harris Zwerling, from whom I learned this example, commented, “It is both easy and tempting to infer that their low cancer rates are directly due to the clean living of the rural lifestyle—no air pollution, no water pollution, access to fresh food without additives.” This makes perfect sense.

Now consider the counties in which the incidence of kidney cancer is highest. These ailing counties tend to be mostly rural, sparsely populated, and located in traditionally Republican states in the Midwest, the South, and the West. Tongue-in-cheek, Wainer and Zwerling comment: “It is easy to infer that their high cancer rates might be directly due to the poverty of the rural lifestyle—no access to good medical care, a high-fat diet, and too much alcohol, too much tobacco.” Something is wrong, of course. The rural lifestyle cannot explain both very high and very low incidence of kidney cancer.

Interesting right? Before we answer this, let’s dive down to another, easier to understand case study –

Imagine a large urn filled with marbles. Half the marbles are red, half are white. Next, imagine a very patient person (or a robot) who blindly draws 4 marbles from the urn, records the number of red balls in the sample, throws the balls back into the urn, and then does it all again, many times. If you summarize the results, you will find that the outcome “2 red, 2 white” occurs (almost exactly) 6 times as often as the outcome “4 red” or “4 white.” This relationship is a mathematical fact. You can predict the outcome of repeated sampling from an urn just as confidently as you can predict what will happen if you hit an egg with a hammer. You cannot predict every detail of how the shell will shatter, but you can be sure of the general idea. There is a difference: the satisfying sense of causation that you experience when thinking of a hammer hitting an egg is altogether absent when you think about sampling.

A related statistical fact is relevant to the cancer example. From the same urn, two very patient marble counters take turns. Jack draws 4 marbles on each trial, Jill draws 7. They both record each time they observe a homogeneous sample—all white or all red. If they go on long enough, Jack will observe such extreme outcomes more often than Jill—by a factor of 8 (the expected percentages are 12.5% and 1.56%). Again, no hammer, no causation, but a mathematical fact: samples of 4 marbles yield extreme results more often than samples of 7 marbles do. Now imagine the population of the United States as marbles in a giant urn. Some marbles are marked KC, for kidney cancer. You draw samples of marbles and populate each county in turn. Rural samples are smaller than other samples. Just as in the game of Jack and Jill, extreme outcomes (very high and/or very low cancer rates) are most likely to be found in sparsely populated counties. This is all there is to the story.

We all have read about ‘law of large numbers’ somewhere or the other. It basically says that as the number of experiments (samples) increases, the actual ratio of outcomes will converge on the theoretical or expected ratio of outcomes. But it is the flip side i.e. the law of small numbers which gets lesser attention intuitively and unless that is understood, we have not truly grasp the former concept.

There are few things to internalise here:

  1. Large samples are more precise than small samples. (What constitutes large enough sample size is another discussion entirely. )
  2. Small samples yield extreme results more often than large sample does.
  3. We, as humans, are bad intuitive statisticians as the reasoning behind the finding of kidney cancer survey highlights. This has been the recurring theme across the topics covered in this book.

So what this particular concept has to do with investing?

 A lot I would say when it comes to evaluating businesses and making decisions.

Studying limited or recent history of a business:

In my experience, most of the participants in the market look at last 2-3 year operating history of a business. Then based on those numbers and adjusting for what company has to say they extrapolate and make their own estimates for the next year or two. This seems to be highly inadequate. Ideally, for analysing a business, we need to assess how it has performed over an entire business cycle which includes peaks and troughs. Depending upon the business, these cycles could take anywhere between 3-8 years orbiting across multitude of business conditions.

Even a five-year analysis of past numbers could be inadequate. Remember 2003-08 period? Everything was hunky-dory during this period and someone who thought those margins and growth rates could sustain made lot of bad bets in 2007-2008 period. This could have been avoided if one rather looked at numbers from say the year 2000. FY2000-03 was a painful time for the economy as a whole. So essentially, for most of the businesses out there, 2000-2008 would have covered substantial part of their entire business cycle.

Clearly, two years does not seem to be reasonable sample size.

Implications while evaluating smaller businesses:

Businesses which rely on one narrow / niche type of an activity accounting for bulk of their revenues and operating over smaller geographical area are bound to see higher level of extreme fluctuations in their business operations versus a bigger, more operationally & geographically diversified company. This partly explains why we see higher volatility in stock prices of small caps & midcaps over large caps leading to higher beta – something which ‘modern portfolio theory’ shuns.

This does not mean smaller businesses are bad. In fact, they happen to be an ideal hunting ground for spotting upon mis-priced securities from time to time (but definitely not all the time). Only thing is that we acknowledge the occurrence of such fluctuations (in business as well as market quotations) and prepare to take advantage of the same as when time favours and not run-like-hell when things turn bad temporarily.

As Buffett once said ‘look at market fluctuations as your friend rather than your enemy; profit from folly rather than participate in it.’

Adopting an incorrect time horizon in your investment decision making:

This is one of the worst things investor can do for himself. Thinking in terms of days, weeks or months is hazardous for your investing life. This, in essence, runs polar opposite to what compounding aims to achieve.

One is bound to see higher fluctuations in market price over shorter periods and hence frequent conversion from black to red and then, if he sticks along, black. As Michael Mauboussin notes in one of the chapters of his book ‘More than you know’, probability of making positive spread over one day is 50% while over one year it rises impressively to 72%. Over 10 years, it is about 100%. By trading frequently and focusing on daily price movement, we trade in a 100% probability event for a 50% one. How rational is this?

There is lot to learn from Kahneman and this piece focused on some of the commonly overlooked follies relating to smaller numbers and how it applies to investing. It is recommended to read this book and absorb what it aims to deliver. I aim to post couple of the articles, as when I get time, on some of these concepts and how they are relevant for us as investors.

Thanks for reading. Cheers!

Position Sizing

As an investor, amongst some of the advantages we enjoy is that of ‘diversification’. Unlike a businessman whose entire fortune is tied to one particular field of operation, we can spread it across multiple such businesses. Though that doesn’t mean our financial result from owning that particular business will turn out to be different from that of the business owner but we are better able to manage risks associated with any particular set of variables at the portfolio level.

But just like many other simple ideas whenever we take something to the extremes, we end up turning a boon into a bane. While taking away risks associated with owning a single business, the proponents of (excessive) diversification end up taking (ignorantly) the risk associated with too much diversification.

Speaking with excessive diversification, Phil Fisher said –

Too few people, however, give sufficient thought to the evils of other extreme. This is the disadvantage of having eggs in so many baskets that a lot of the eggs do not end up in really attractive baskets, and it is impossible to keep watching all the baskets after the eggs get put into them.

So, in otherwords to do away with the horrors of ‘putting all eggs in one basket’ we have ignorantly created entirely new set of complexities. It is not unheard of and in fact some of the top funds in the country hold as much as 40-80 stocks in their portfolio. They seem to be inspired by Noah’s rule – two of each and end up with a zoo 🙂 But to be fair some of these funds do suffer from something like ‘diseconomies of scale’ – they are too big a fish for the pond they are in. But it is not unheard of people – without having any size constraints – end up owning more than 25-30 stocks.

Which is the right number?

This is not the right question to ask in my view -partly because there are no precise answer for this. As investors we are trying to do away with risks while maximising our returns like improving upon our returns per unit of risk.

As Buffett said, in investing risk lies not knowing what you are doing. So for a professional investor if there is a particular industry or business which he cannot make out head or tail of it, his ideal weight there should be not more than zero. Again, it is not necessary to understand all the intricate details of a potential investment but certainly he should be able to understand it to the extent of action he is taking.

So, you certainly do not need to know what all goes into making ready to cook noodles but what you should know is factors which could influence its demand, the probability of adversities hitting the business from time to time, competition and how do they stack up against the company so on and so forth.

So if we cannot understand all the adversities which business in question generally faces or arrive at a reasonable range of probabilities of those adversities affecting the company then probably we may not be competent enough to own it. Which is fine. There are thousands of companies listed in India and we just need to move on to the one next in queue 🙂

So coming back to the question, if there is no specific number to hook ourselves too, then what is it which should guide us in our portfolio construction?

Fisher has answered this question beautifully with an analogy of his –

How much diversification is really necessary and how much is dangerous? It is somewhat like infantrymen stacking rifles.

A rifleman cannot get as firm a stack by balancing two rifles as he can by using five or six properly placed. However, he can get just as secure a stack with five as he could with fifty.

In this matter of diversification, however, there is one big difference between stacking rifles and common stocks.

With rifles, the number needed for a firm stack does not usually depend on the kind of rifle used. With stocks, the nature of the stock itself has a tremendous amount to do with the amount of diversification actually needed.

So adequate diversification depends up nature of the business in question. Given that expected returns are otherwise equal, a company which has its business spread across three different segments such that none of the segment contributes significantly versus the other, the amount of weight one can have in his portfolio for such business would be higher than the one which derives returns from just one segment assuming both of these businesses are otherwise equally strong.

For example, if otherwise expected returns are more or less the same, one can have more weight in HUL which has its business spread across multiple SKUs versus Bajaj Corp which is sort of a one product company earning all of his revenues from sales of light hair oil brand ‘Almond drops’.

So ‘strategic business unit’ (SBU) is what one should look at. While owning businesses we are indirectly owning their earning machines i.e. the SBU. If an investor assigns equal weight to Bajaj Corp and HUL, we should be aware that his exposure of a particular SBU is higher in case of former than the latter company. There is nothing wrong in his if one is compensated well enough to do so. But why take additional risk for free?

Second thing which Fisher says is management bandwidth. Generally, we see that in small companies, decision making is centered around one particular individual. Though nothing wrong in this since sometimes it is due to visionaries like these that the company has attained a particular level in the business but if the shoes are too big to fit and if there is no one else standing in the queue to take realms of the company then there is some additional risk here. Though it would be wrong of think of it as fatal. Replacement only takes time and patience from us as owners.

Also, family managed businesses may sometimes end up having lower bandwidth from a non-family driven or a professionally managed business. But again sometimes the commitment level of the management which some of these family owned businesses is difficult to match by someone who draws monthly salary. And there is also lesser chance of CEO leaving the company and joining a competitor 🙂 . But then these companies are good till the time family members stick together. Many of the synergies across products which they today enjoy would disappear tomorrow if the family were to split.

One last thing which one should look at is the exposure to the portfolio from owning businesses operating in similar SBUs. So if out of the love for recently announced ‘demonetisation’, if one ends up owning 20 stocks – 15 of which are banks, needless to say he is taking excessive risk and his portfolio is as good as undiversified. Hope he is also accompanying his investee companies in the evening calls which RBI has with banks these days!

One of the investor I follow and respect had 40% of his portfolio parked in Berkshire Hathaway stock (a company owned and managed by Buffett and his partner Charlie Munger) few years back. Given that Berkshire owns hundreds of SBUs – most of which are franchise in itself – and the depth of the management along with succession planning which they had been worked upon for more than a decade now, it does not seem so surprising to me now. Though I think this guy does have guts made up of steel – and hopefully so that of his clients 🙂

Thanks for reading. Hope you enjoyed as much as I did while writing it. If you have some additional points / insights, do write in the section below. It would be interesting to expand upon this concept further.

Niraj Bardia

Disclaimer: Stocks discussed in this post are for educational purpose only and not recommendations to buy or sell. Please contact a certified investment adviser for your investment decisions.

Some notes on ‘Measuring the Moat’

Recently, was fortunate enough to come across a report by Michael Mauboussion & his team titled ‘Measuring the Moat’. Moats, as such is an interesting concept and its application in evaluating businesses was popularised by Buffett.

This is what he said more than two decades back –

What we refer to as a “moat” is what other people might call competitive advantage . . . It’s something that differentiates the company from its nearest competitors – either in service or low cost or taste or some other perceived virtue that the product possesses in the mind of the consumer versus the next best alternative . . . There are various kinds of moats. All economic moats are either widening or narrowing – even though you can’t see it.

This report builds further on that concept and explains its readers some of the factors which makes an investment attractive and unattractive.

Why is it important for us as investors? For a long term investor, his results will not be far different from that of the firm & the industry in which it operates. Hence, it is imperative to understand the underlying businesses well before committing larger sums for years. Also, the most important thing – it is fun & challenging enough to delve deeper for understanding these 🙂

Would recommended everyone to spend sometime thinking about what Mr. Maubossion is saying in order to improve our own lenses of evaluating things. I personally found the discussion which begin post porter’s five forces section revealing. Also, interesting was the discussion on why sometimes established incumbents loose to smaller entrants in the industry with a slightly different but efficient business models.

Some of the points which I found useful & revealing out of this report along with my interpretations of the same are:

  • Asset specificity (at industry level):

Can the assets be put to use to some other purpose or are the fortunes tied to a very narrow business area? Take for example pipe manufacturing industry. Given the thin operating margin generally, high production scale is the key to lower costs and remain competitive. Also, equally important is to keep those capacities running. As a result, we generally see higher segmental concentration either in line pipes or sewage pipelines or oil & gas related pipes. Add to this, there is geographical concentration involved since pipes are generally bulky to transport over longer distances. These explains why companies witnesses wide swings in profitability regularly over the years.

As a rule in the world of business & investing, higher business (product & geography) concentration & general slowdown in the industry would only lead to  intense competition amongst the participants in business which produces undifferentiated products. Hence, having cost advantages is crucial in ‘commodity’ like or average businesses.

One of the successful players in this tough industry is Ratnamani which have managed to navigate through these vicissitudes reasonably well over the years. But this is more of an exception rather than a norm.

  • Production Scale:

This concept applies to both manufacturing & software products industry. Though there is a subtle difference. While production costs fall only upto a point called ‘minimum efficient scale of production’ in case of manufacturing firms, that for software products keeps on falling with each incremental user. They key is IP protection and product differentiation as only then will the excess returns stay. Customer captivity is also vital in case of software products. Important example here could be Microsoft, Android.

Another key takeaway is to look at dominating companies within fast growing industry closely. It is possible that with increase in market size, other players might achieve similar production scale advantages leading to evaporation of excess returns. Maruti of 1990’s is an example.

  • Fleeting moats:

Moats give pretty strong foundation to the success an economic castle. But what if a newer entrant manages to destroy those foundations? Apple, Google destroyed branding, distribution & ecosystem advantage which Nokia enjoyed – just like Kodak. Currently, Pantanjali is attacking the establishments of Indian FMCG players. Difference between the former was technology advantage which newer entrants had. In the case of latter, how much damage Patanjali does would depend upon how deep does patanjali brand resonates with the customers, distribution reach it manages to expand and switching incentive it could provide by pricing its goods lower.

Technology companies generally have higher rate of changes and hence weaker moats, if any.. more so if areas of operations are limited / concentrated.

  • Barriers to Exit:

Low investments need and non-specific assets leads to lower exit barriers and vice-versa. Telecom space in India, incidentally, suffers on both counts.

  • Demand Variability:

When demand for products is highly variable, it induces excess capacity creation at peak which means when cycles moves through difficult times, there is intense rivalry amongst firms. Whenever demand is variable generally there is a lack of co-ordination amongst the participants which means pricing pressures do not easily abate during down cycle.

Cartel is difficult to sustain since given the fluctuating demand, there is an incentive strong enough to cheat.

  • Stagnant Industries:

No growth or very low industries are like zero sum games. In order to make more economic profits, one needs to snatch market share away from other players which intensifies rivalry unlike in industries where economic profits are continuously rising for all the players. Hence, rivalry could be stronger here.

  • Rate of change in cost:

To what extent can a new comer enter the industry and also have the advantage of lowering his costs over incumbent players such that new comer happens to have a lower cost of production. Happens with businesses dependent upon technology led upgradations (like textile, cement, telecom etc). Legacy systems becomes unproductive over relatively shorter time frame in some of these industries.

  • Economies of Scope:

Lowering per unit cost of production by pursuing multiple activities in related field of operation such that activities become path dependent overtime. Some chemical companies happen to develop their business models around this concept.

In my view, this is a good enough moat especially if a player is able to gain significant market share in one or more of these products. This reduces an opportunity for competitors to replicate similar model since market size itself would not warrant such replication.

  • Network Effects:

There are two types of networks (i) Radical or hub & spoke and (ii) Interactive. Interactive (naukri) is stronger than Radical (V-Mart, Walmart). Latter may have scale advantages.

Another interesting discussion is on innovation & disruption. It nicely explains why it is more probable than not that incumbents would ignore / ridicule a ‘disruptor’ which only allow them time & resources to improve upon their processes to later take on incumbents.

It talks about mini-steel mills in 1970s which started with using scrap steel as raw material for finished steel. Initially their quality was not as good as that of integrated steel mills and hence their products found limited adoption, mostly into rebar segment, but their prices were competitive. Integrated steel mills did not mind to get out of those segments since any which ways much of that was low margin business for them. But this allowed mini-steel mills to prosper and overtime improve upon quality of their output and capture even more market share.

This in some ways also helps us understand why facebook paid staggering $19Bn for whatsapp. By doing this, they not only got their feet into an evolving ecosystem with an established product but also avoided the threat of future competition from it which could have meant losing billions in form of prolonged competition directly and indirectly.

There are lot of interesting stuff to learn from this beautiful work and above list is able to just provide a fraction of those learnings. It is highly recommended to spend some time going through it.

Stocks discussed in this post are for educational purpose only and not recommendations to buy or sell. Please contact a certified investment adviser for your investment decisions.

Philip Fisher on ‘When to buy’

Recently, I was reading one of the best works of Philip Fisher – his book ‘Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits’ written more than half a century ago. His thought process happens to be simple but highly effective – a best known combination for success in the business of investing. Although as contradictory it may sound, just like Benjamin Graham, he had adopted throughout his career an owner-like attitude while evaluating stocks. And just like Buffett, his favourite holding period was near about forever! In fact, he continued to hold his investment in Motorola for about 21 years right till the day he died. It is rare to find people having this kind of temperament in investing – despite this being precisely the field where one cannot ask for anything less than this type of commitment at least while evaluating businesses.

In one of the chapters of the book discussing when to buy stocks, his owner like thinking shines beautifully. Reflecting upon his long experience in the markets he observes-

As word first gets out about a spectacular new product in the laboratory of a well-run company, eager buyers bid up the prices of that company’s shares. When the word comes of successful pilot-plant operation, the shares go still higher. Few think of the old analogy that operating a pilot plant is like driving an automobile over a winding country road at ten miles per hour. Running a commercial plant is like driving on that same road at 100 miles per hour.

Then when month after month difficulties crop up in getting the commercial plant started, these unexpected expenses causes per-share earnings to dip noticeably. Word spreads that the plant is in trouble. Nobody can guarantee when, if ever, the problems will be solved. The former eager buyers of the stock become discouraged sellers. Down goes the price of the stock. The longer the shake-down lasts the more the market quotations sag.  At last comes the good news that the plant is finally running smoothly. A two-day rally occurs in the price of the stock. However, in the following quarter when special sales expenses have caused a still further sag in the net income, the stock falls to the lowest price in years. Word passes all through the financial community that the management has blundered.

Buffet has said long back that in investing risk lies in not knowing what one is doing. Although, this was a hypothetical example put up by Fisher, such cases are not entirely unheard of in the markets. Quarterly number focused members of the street are known to experience such vicissitudes & mood swings. An investor having owner-like attitude would have better navigated such turbulences which is the part and parcel of our profession. Having known that these near term setbacks are actually indicators of things actually panning out, he would have only added to his position at such bargain prices. It couldn’t have been a better time for him.

What is interesting is that this attitude of the street i.e. focusing on near term results has not much changed since last 60 years when Fisher wrote this. Nor do I think it would change over the next 60 years 🙂

Further, he continues –

At this point the stock might well prove a sensational buy. Once the extra sales effort has produced enough volume to make the first production scale plant pay, normal sales effort is frequently enough to continue the upward movement of the sales curve for many years. Since the same techniques are used, the placing in operation of a second, third, fourth, and fifth plant can nearly always be done without the delays and special expenses that occurred during the prolonged shake-down period of the first plant. By the time plant Number Five is running at (optimum) capacity, the company has grown so big and prosperous that the whole cycle can be repeated on another brand new product without the same drain on earnings percentage-wise or the same downward effect on the company’s shares. The investor has acquired at the right time an investment which can grow for him for many years.

Though he talks about timing in the end, what really created an impact on me was his ability to think through clearly about his stocks for years together. Usually, one might have sold his position, at a descent profit when commercial plant came into operations and market corrected itself and now starts pricing thing efficiently. But Fisher did not think so. He could see that, although stock is now fairly valued with respect to its current earnings, this business could actually go upon expanding its sales as well as its margins which could create a bigger impact on profits. He could see capacity going 5x after years of initial commissioning.

Obviously, lot of things have to go right for the company for this to happen but he was willing to wait and see it coming thereby selling in finally at an even higher profit. It was his owner-like approach, understanding of the business and long term thinking which would have earned him this.

He came in hunting for a bargain like a ‘value guy’ and left out earning profits which ‘growth investors’ would envy – if at all such stereotype distinction exists.

Idea is thinking about stocks not as mere pieces of paper but as businesses in their own right, as Graham would say.


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